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Japan's economy is one of the success stories of the post-World War II era.
Literally rising from the ashes of wartime destruction and neglect, the Japanese
economy is today the second strongest economy in the world. Given this success,
the role of the Japanese government in economic growth and the nature of state-
society relationships in economic policymaking is a subject of considerable interest. It
is also a subject of much controversy. Japan is often seen as the world's most
successful example of government directed economic development (1). Admirers of
Japan's success look to her "market-following" government strategies and alleged
strong government-business cooperation as a solution to productivity and
competitiveness lags in other countries (2). Elsewhere, critics of Japanese policy
assert that these same tendencies are a threat to the survival of the world's other
leading economies (3). Both of these groups believe that the Japanese government
had a strong, directive role in that country's economy.
Some Japan specialists attribute a different, less dominant role in economic
affairs to the Japanese state. These persons see Japanese economic policy as an
arena of government-private sector negotiation and some view government inputs as
secondary in importance to private sector behavior as a driver of the economy (4).
For example, many economist feel that the government’s main contribution to
Japan’s economic dynamism was encouragement of high savings and investment,
and that Japan’s economy is motivated mainly by private sector competition like that
in other advanced countries (5).
Obviously there are many views of Japanese economic development. All
observers agree that Japan's economy has come far since World War II's end, even
while differing on the causes and significance of the government's role in this growth.
The differences in interpretation reflect different initial assumptions and different
research concerns in an area of considerable complexity. Studies which assert a
strong government role normally haven't examined policymaking and policy
implementation processes and ignore the inputs of private interests for this reason.
Some studies which downgrade the government role reflect normative preferences
for free competition.
In this chapter, I will review different explanations of Japanese economic
growth and attempt a synthesis of different views. I will also examine the implications
of a general model of Japanese politics -conflict amidst cooperation and structure- for
patterns in political economic behavior. We anticipate that we will reject the simple,
bureaucratic dominance model of Japanese economic policy. It is likely that Japan's
economic policymaking will often be pluralistic despite periodic efforts to structure
relationships and make competition orderly and that economic policies will be the
result of negotiation between public and private sector actors. Reflecting the
importance of inter-actor negotiations, policies will include elements of both ministry
ideology and private firm concerns for profits and market shares. Despite strong and
redundant personal and institutional ties between private interests and state
ministries, and frequent inter-actor consultation, there will also be frequent
disagreements in these privileged channels. Finally, many policy decisions will be
politicized and public policies serving political clients may be quantitatively as
important as incentives for developing industries (6).
Japan's Economic Miracle: The Record. Japan's economic performance
since World War II is one of the truly dramatic trends in recent world economic
history. Starting with an economy drastically disrupted by World War II and more
dependent on foreign raw-material sources than that of any other major power,
Japan in some years registered the highest annual growth rates ever experienced in
the development of the world's major economies.
The record is just as impressive from the perspective of Japanese history.
Japan made major strides in economic growth before World War II. In 1939 Japan
was the most advanced industrialized nation outside of Western Europe and North
America, but still had some characteristics -among them, extensive rural poverty and
strong light industries exports- found in some "third world" economies today. Six
years later and devastated by war, Japan's economic potential was reduced to less
than one third of its former capacity. Yet by the 1950s Japan had recovered prewar
production levels and by 1990 economic output in constant prices was over six times
that of 1960; nominal GDP increased 24 times in this same period. The performance
of the economy in industrial sectors such as iron and steel, automobiles, machinery
and electronics was especially strong.
Trends in the gross national product provide a good beginning point to
measure Japan's postwar economic success. In 1955 (roughly the beginning of the
high growth period) Japan's nominal GNP was $24 billion. By 1978 the GNP figure
had reached $963 billion and by 1991 Japan's GNP was assessed at $3.4 trillion
(Table 1)(7). As part of this pattern, Japan experienced very high growth rates in
some individual years. The peak years in this trend were 1960, 1961 and 1964, when
13-14 percent real growth was observed. Growth in 1968-1969 was almost as rapid.
These figures were dramatically higher than growth rates in other economies up until
that time (8).
When the Japanese figures are compared on a per-capita basis with those
from other industrialized countries, Japan's economic success can be seen even
more clearly (Table 1). In 1952, Japan's per-capita GNP was $188, roughly
one-twelfth that of the United States and one-half that of West Germany. By 1960,
Japanese per-capita GDP had grown to $458, while by the mid-1970s it was well
over $4,000 and nearly 60 percent of American and German levels. By 1980,
reflecting changes in currency values as well as continued growth in most years, the
Japanese figure soared even closer to the levels registered in the United States and
West Germany. By 1990 both Japan and Germany had passed the United States.
Per-capita nominal GDP in Japan had increased 31 times from 1952 to 1990(9). In
slightly over one century Japan was transformed from being a predominantly poor,
agricultural country to be one of the world's most successful economies.
Postwar growth in production in specific industries provides a further graphic
testimony of Japan's success. Increases in steel production are an excellent indicator
of postwar industrial growth. Japan was already unique in the non-Western world
before World War II by virtue of its then high levels of steel production relative to
other countries outside of Europe and North America. In 1896 Japanese steel output
was only an estimated 100 tons, but by 1936 steel production had reached 3.6 million
tons. By 1960, in the middle of the high growth period, the figure for Japan had grown
to a much greater 22 million tons and in 1973, Japan reached its peak postwar steel
output of 119 million tons (10). Since then Japan has ranked second in the world in
crude steel output behind the USSR.
Gross production and crude steel figures are good indicators of Japan's
overall postwar economic performance. GDP and GNP estimates indicate the
general shape of economic growth, and crude steel is one of the most basic of
industrial commodities because of its use in many other manufactured products. Still,
these general performance figures do not tell the whole story. Quite a bit of Japan's
postwar success has been due to growth and enormous export sales of specific
industries. In the 1950s and early 1960s these industries included shipbuilding and
steel. Later, the automobile, electronics and machine tool industries replaced these
products as export leaders.
The automobile industry is a striking example of Japanese growth and
related export success. In the early postwar era, Japan's automobile production was
very small, actually minuscule in comparison with the United States and Europe. In
1960, for example, Japan produced only 165 thousand automobiles and 308
thousand trucks. By 1970, however, automobile production alone had increased to
over 3 million units, and by 1990, the figure was nearly 10 million units, a
sixty-two-fold increase in production over a twenty eight year period. By 1980
Japanese passenger car production exceeded that of the United States, the world
leader up until then (11). In recent years roughly half of the automobiles produced in
Japan were exported, with a large share of these exports going to North America.
Production data for several other modern manufactures indicate similarly
successful trajectories, as do also figures for Japan's foreign trade. As is well known,
Japan is currently the world's largest exporter of automobiles and consumer
electronics, as well as a major exporter of many other industrial commodities.
Japan's economic miracle was all the more impressive in view of that
country's traditional dependence on foreign imports of many of the raw materials
needed for industrial production. Currently Japan imports nearly all of its energy
needs; imported crude oil contributes 99.5% of Japan's requirements, while the figure
for coal is 92%. Other minerals are also scarce in Japan: the dependency ratio for
iron ore is 100%, while that for copper –the only metal of importance mined in Japan-
is 98.9%. Over half of Japan's food needs are also met by imports, with feed grains,
corn, wheat and soybeans leading the way (12).
Japanese Governments Economic Plans . Japan's economy was severely
weakened during World War II: plants and facilities were damaged or destroyed, and
work was disrupted by mobilization and flight from the cities. Many of the initial
policies of Japanese government after the end of the war were concerned with repair
of physical facilities and the more complex task of reviving an economy whose basic
institutions were disrupted and disorganized. In the early postwar era Japan also
suffered from loss of former sources of critical raw materials. In contrast with the
immediate postwar years, the decades of the 1950s and 1960s were generally a
period of consolidation and growth. Throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s, the
Japanese government was supportive of economic growth, at times at the expense
of alternative policy choices.
From the 1950s on, the Japanese government endeavored to promote
economic growth through various macro-economic policies and by sectoral programs
aimed at development of specific industries. An alternative policy commitment to a
major rearmament was essentially rejected after an intense debate. Specific
government economic tools, including government bank loans, tax incentives and
trade protection, were developed and deployed to foster modernization and growth.
Indicative economic planning began in Japan in the 1950s (13). Five major
plans were developed and promulgated by the Economic Planning Agency between
1955 and 1967 (Figure 1), and other plans have followed over time. Indicative plans
set economic goals and do not provide sanctions for non-compliance. Like their
French counterparts, the Japanese plans served as broad outlines for guidance of
public and private economic activity rather than as compulsory programs. Japan's
plans were essentially large-scale development forecasts buttressed by elaborate
statistical references and supplemented by programs for growth in specific sectors in
quite a few cases. The plan documents contained specific target figures for
everything from farm crops to the output from specific major industries. The plans
also contained sections on infrastructure, public works and social programs needs.
Each of the plans had a special focus and target slogans, such as catching up with
Britain (1953-1957) or the doubling of incomes (1960-1967). As time went on and the
economy prospered, and new needs in environment protection or social security
became obvious, the concerns addressed by the plans shifted more to non-economic
goals in the quality of life and welfare areas. The planning process continues even
today although the plans are given much less public attention than in the early
postwar era.
Industry "rationalization" and development policies and government foreign
trade policies supplemented the general economic plans in the effort to promote
economic growth and shape its directions in specific industries. The Ministries of
International Trade and Industry and Transportation orchestrated a wide range of
supports to encourage development and competitive viability in international markets.
Most of the laws and plans developed as part of these programs were very general
and can best be seen as policy frameworks. General goals were indicated by these
frameworks. More specific programs and policy tools were developed and deployed
under the "umbrella" provided by the framework laws and policies. As can be seen
from the examples in Figure 1 the emphases on different industries changed over
time. The 1950s programs addressed infra-structure needs and heavy industries,
namely power, coal, shipping, steel and petrochemicals (especially fertilizer). Later
interest shifted more to automobiles, machine tools and electronics.
Specific policy tools such as government bank loans, accelerated tax
depreciation allowances for equipment purchases, special tax reserve funds for
export market development, and tax deductions for income earned overseas were
designed to foster growth and promote exports in particular areas following the
general directions indicated in the "framework" documents. MITI control over raw
materials and technology import licenses permitted allocation of critical materials and
processes to industries slated for development, especially in the 1950s and early
1960s. In the 1960s, inter-firm mergers were also encouraged on the assumption
that concentration would lead to greater international competitive power. Other policy
instruments included protective tariffs and import quotas and the sanctioning of
inter-firm cartels. Information in Figure 2 shows the cluster of policy tools developed
to support the computer and "information" industry under specific framework
legislation and serves as an example of the multi-faceted government efforts.
Macro-Economic Policy and Japan's Fiscal Investment and Loan Program.
Japan's macro-economic policies generally supported the government's
commitment to growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Monetary policy sought to maintain
economic stability and to reduce pressure on currency reserves when internal
demand led to increased imports. On some occasions industrial targeting plans
were held back in deference to counter-cyclical monetary policies.
One of the most important contributions by the Japanese government to the
support of economic development during this period was its commitment to fiscal
restraint. Japan in the 1960s had the lowest level of taxation of any major industrial
power. In 1965 total taxation in Japan (excluding social security contributions)
amounted to 18 percent of gross domestic product, in contrast with 27-35 percent for
the United States, Britain, Germany and France. Public expenditures from the annual
budgets in Japan also carried out a theme of limited government. In the 1950s and
1960s government outlays on current account represented only 13-14 percent of
gross domestic product in Japan, whereas in other industrialized countries they
ranged as high as 30 percent. Constrained government expenditures were one way
to facilitate savings and investment. Less was extracted from national income and
allocated to public expenditures in Japan than in other industrialized nations (Table
2), which permitted allocations of funds to other purposes.
A major reason for the comparative differences in government expenditures
were lower Japanese outlays on social programs and defense. After an intense
debate in the early 1950s over defense outlays vs. economic development, Japan's
government decided to place growth at the top of its agenda. A restricted
defense-force concept was developed at this time with the result that subsequent
defense outlays hovered around 1 percent of the national income in much of the
postwar era (14). In contrast, United States spent around 6 percent of its GDP on
defense in most years while other countries in the NATO alliance normally spent
between 3 and 6 percent on their military efforts (15). In the mid-1960s Japan also
spent a little less on social welfare outlays than the United States and roughly one
third of the amounts committed to social programs by European countries. The
picture is much the same today, with the exception that Japanese expenditures on
social security are much higher because of policy changes in the 1970s and the
maturing of the pension system. Japan’s government pension and health care
programs are now as comprehensive as those in some Western European countries.
Expenditures will continue to grow in this area as time passes (16).
In addition to a constrained fiscal policy, the Japanese government
encouraged investment by maintaining low interest rates in some periods (17). The
OECD estimated by the late 1960s that gross fixed investment in Japan averaged
38 percent of gross domestic product each year; the comparable figures for other
major industrialized countries ranged between 16 percent for the United States and
26 percent for France (18). In addition to whatever effects ensued from government
policy, investment was facilitated by high postwar individual and  corporate savings
rates relative to other countries. An individual disposition to save was itself further
encouraged by tax exemptions for small savings deposits, including those made
through the vast postal savings system (19). Even after a shift toward greater
consumption Japanese savings levels are today still slightly higher than those in
Germany and France and twice those of the United States (20).
Personal savings deposited in Japan's postal savings system are funneled
into capital investments by the government-run Fiscal Investment and Loan Program
(FILP), an unusual but also highly significant institution. The FILP also drew funds
from social security deposits. The FILP has ranged in size between 27 and 55
percent of the Japanese government budget in different periods. Since most of the
FILP’s funds come from non-tax sources, the FILP cannot strictly be compared with
the budget even though some of its uses of funds are comparable to budget
expenditures elsewhere.
Even though budgets were themselves constrained in Japan compared with
other industrialized countries, the existence of the FILP is very important. The FILP
programs make the Japanese government role more significant than is indicated by
budget information alone. The FILP has invested in fields such as roads, railways,
ports, housing, and other social and industrial infrastructure projects as well as
supporting direct loans to industries via institutions such as the Japan Development
Bank. In 1955 through 1962 between 11 and 21 percent of the FILP's funds were
designated for basic industrial development. Since that time the FILP's direct role in
funding industrial growth has steadily decreased. Currently only 2,5 percent of the
FILP's substantial funds go to direct support of large scale industry (see also Table
6). FILP's role in financing medium and small business and infrastructure
development has grown substantially through programs which contribute to overall
economic growth in different channels from high-profile industries. These programs
are discussed further below.
Evaluations of the Government's Role . The combination of rapid economic
growth, sharp production gains in important industries and export successes with
extensive macro- and micro-economic planning has suggested to many persons that
the Japanese state played a large role in economic development. Japan has been
seen as a uniquely successful example among major economies of government
stimulus of private sector firms to modernize production processes because of the
coincidence between policy and dynamic growth. This view and perceptions that the
Japanese market is closed has led U.S. and EEC politicians to accuse Japan of
engaging in economic practices which "tilted the playing field". In contrast, quite a few
academic studies of Japanese economic policies and their impact present a more
qualified view of the state's role in the economy than the opinions just cited. The
authors of these accounts see state-economy linkages as complex and government
actions as having mixed effects (Figure 3).
One of the best known characterizations of Japanese government economic
policy from the dominant state viewpoint is the work of Chalmers Johnson. In his
pioneering study of MITI, Japan is seen as a "developmental state" having special
priorities and influence. In Johnson's words (21):
"The priorities of the Japanese state derive first and foremost from an
assessment of Japan's situational imperatives…These...include late
development, a lack of natural resources, a large population, a need to trade
and the constraints of the international balance of payments.... Nurturing the
economy has been a major priority of the Japanese state because any other
course of action implied dependency, poverty and the possible breakdown of
the social system.
A state (mainly MITI) developmental "ideology" is seen by Johnson as the
major driving force in industrial plans. By imposing their own version of economic
rationality, or by basing economic policies on a synthesis of government technocratic
formulae and market information, the Japanese government ministries are said to
have been capable of successfully guiding economic growth. Johnson's view has
become the mainstay of popular knowledge about the Japanese government's
economic role, both among admirers and critics of Japanese policy(22).
Some economists take a radically different view of the Japanese
government's importance to economic growth. For example, Hugh Patrick and Henry
Rosovsky have written that the state's role as less important than private sector
initiatives and that Japan is much like European mixed economies as the result(32).
Several investigators also state views of Japan's governmental role which lie
somewhere between the two extremes represented by Johnson's strong
interventionist state and a view of the state as using mainly conventional fiscal and
monetary tools to stimulate the economy. Their interpretations of Japanese
government economic policy emphasize that (a) most important economic decisions
are politicized, (b) policy inputs by interest groups and firms are often more
influential than those of the government and (c) industry interests and government
rationales aren't always complementary. The ends of state policy are also seen as
being subverted by firms, behavior or unanticipated market trends. Among this group
Richard Samuels is the leading proponent of a view that political influence from firms
and industrial associations influences Policymaking. Samuels also holds that there
are many departures from government ministry intentions in the policies which
emerge from government-interest group negotiations. Samuels is joined by David
Friedman in the assertion that there are often unanticipated aspects of policy
implementation (24).
Interpretations of Japanese government economic policy roles form a rough
continuum which includes two closely related dimensions. The first dimension is the
degree to which the state dominates economic policymaking and implementation.
The second is the character of the rationales employed in economic policymaking. At
one pole, experts see a dominant state which orchestrates economic progress
following its own growth ideology (25). At the other extreme, the state's role is
constrained. Occupying the middle of the continuum are views that economic policy
is a negotiated blend of ministry economic ideology and private interests;
policymaking participation is pluralistic.
In our own view, both poles of the continuum of interpretations of the
Japanese government economic role are unsatisfactory. Johnson's rich history of
MCI and MITI policy development asserts that the state role is dominant without
examining policymaking processes in detail. On the other hand, interpretations by
economists often undervalue the enormous volume of government policymaking,
which established some kind of parameters for economic behavior whatever their mix
of inputs. Because of his deep concern for the details of actual policy processes,
Richard Samuels' study of energy policy from the Meiji era to the present provides
the most instructive available model as to both the nature of participation and also
the rationales in Japanese industrial policymaking. His pioneering contributions are
supplemented by fragmentary evidence from other sources (see Figures 4 and 5
notes).
According to Samuels' study, economic policymaking is normally highly
pluralistic. Policy choices are decided on the basis of negotiations within and
between coalitions of industry associations, individual firms, advisory councils,
ministries and political parties. Most of Samuels' cases thus fit the concept of "state
pluralism" developed in earlier chapters. State pluralism, it will be remembered, is
policymaking where government ministries participate as a proponent of some kind of
policy and conflict takes place between state and private sector actors. Under state
pluralism the final decision is more than simply the result of the interactions within a
parallelogram of power involving mainly private interest groups, the traditional
paradigm for pluralism. In Japan the parallelogram often includes a state ministry as
an active coalition participant in opposition to a coalition including other government
offices.
Three different types of state pluralism can be seen in various economic
policymaking processes (Figure 4). In one form of state interaction with private
groups, two mutually opposing coalitions containing ministries, private sector groups,
business firms and political party politicians debate a policy and negotiate their
differences. Such a bi-polar confrontation took place in a late 1940s debate over a
"priority production plan" for coal and several later energy industry policies (26). A
second type of state pluralism can be seen where important private interests are all
aligned (although not always mutually agreed) against a government ministry. This
policy scenario could be seen in the formulation of plans to "rationalize" the coal
industry in 1955 (27). In still a third example, and one more akin to traditional pluralist
concepts, a government ministry arbitrated agreements between private sector
actors (28).
The presence of several different varieties of state pluralism once again
affirms the dynamism of government-interest group pluralism, as did the shifting
coalitions discussed earlier in connection with 1980s policy processes. Moreover, the
state pluralism we have observed in postwar policymaking isn't unique or new.
Samuels' study documents similar examples as far back as the Meiji period (29).
Although other scholars have not documented the intricacies of policy processes to
the degree displayed in Samuels' work, there are still quite a few examples of firm
independence and therefore of pluralistic processes in other realms. Figure 4
contains relevant examples of state pluralism drawn from Samuels' and other works.
Recent scholarship on Japan's political economy also demonstrates that
multiple rationales guide policy debates. Policies are not based solely on a single
simple formula for economic growth employed by state ministries to support winners.
Instead, both ministries and private interests approach economic policy choices with
multiple goals in regard to any issue as well as having a variety of concerns at
different times. Political parties, local government and trade unions also have multiple
concerns which reflect their own goals and operating rationales.
As Figure 5 illustrates, individual economic policies address in every instance
combinations of multiple rationales. On the government ministry side, some policies
were designed mainly to increase production, others to stimulate productivity, others
to provide a stable domestic supply so as to conserve foreign exchange and others
to relieve burdens on fiscal resources. Specific ministries also proposed economic
policy formulae which would expand their own control, usually because of an
ideological commitment to state intervention and a mistrust of free markets.
Depending on the issue, business firms' main policy goals have included
avoidance of direct government control, profit maximization, survival by avoidance of
bankruptcy, and a acquisition of a stable or growing market share. These and other
concerns have led businesses to make subsidiary demands for various kinds of
actions such as production subsidies, regulations which limit market entry or
government-supported price mechanisms. Other political actors have had similarly
diverse concerns depending on the time and setting. Trade unions were concerned
with continued employment, unemployment benefits, retraining programs,
participation in management and/or, in some periods, nationalization of particular
industries (30). Local governments themselves wanted to avoid footing the bill for
industrial development or adjustments, while maximizing local employment and
prosperity. Politicians made demands based on the rationales advocated by their
groups or localities. Policies were made in what Norton Long has called an ecology
of games (31). Policies are the outcome of a negotiated intersection of various
economic rationales, not the imposition of a single dimensional economic growth
rationale on a variety of actors with varying and not always mutually consistent (or
even simply defined) interests. These complexities indicate there is much more to
government policymaking and its acceptance than solely a bureaucratic ideology of
growth.
Qualifying the Japanese Government Economic Role: The Scope and
Priorities of Government Investments. Before discussing the implications of
government programs in specific economic sectors, two general misconceptions
about the nature of Japanese government investments in the economy must be
addressed. The first point to remember is that the size of government financial
interventions in particular industries, as well as in the economy in general, is often
exaggerated. As Edward Lincoln has stated (32):
"Many of the writings about Japan are very short on numbers, and thereby
slip into an exaggeration of this role by failing to understand the relative size
of government financing of the private sector."
Chalmers Johnson asserts that the Japanese government provided between
one quarter and one third of all industrial capital in the 1950s and a sizable amount of
funds in the 1960s (33). Other studies have also cited similarly substantial levels of
support and/or large government investments and subsidies stated in Japanese yen
which inevitably appear to be much larger amounts than they would if the figures
were quoted in dollars (34). Moreover, Japanese government statistical series,
indicate a more modest state role in direct investment than that suggested by
Johnson or implied elsewhere (35). In Table 3 we calculate the importance of
government bank lending relative to commercial bank lending and also the shares of
government bank loans for equipment investments compared to commercial bank
loans for the same purpose. Specifically, the Japan Development Bank and the
Export-Import Bank, the two Japanese government banking institutions which
typically lend to big business, contributed between 3 and 8 percent of all industrial
loans in the 1950s, and roughly the same amounts in the 1960s. The share of
government lending actually peaked in the 1970s at between 9 and 11 percent, a
time when recessed industries made heavy claims on government. Relatedly, the
Japan Development Bank, the main government "policy" bank supportive of
modernization of production facilities, provided industry between 5 and 6% of its
equipment investment needs in the 1950s and between 3 and 5 percent thereafter.
Although the relative amounts of government lending are not insignificant,
government lending was considerably smaller in scale than the earlier information
indicated or implied (36).
A second important qualification on the Japanese government's role in the
economy concerns the priorities represented by government bank loans to specific
industries and the implications of these priorities. Here two kinds of information are
relevant, the shares of Japan Development Bank Loans provided to specific
industries and the degree to which these industries were dependent on government
financing (Table 4). Four industries -shipping, electric power, coal and iron and steel-
received the lion's share of government loans in the 1950s. These same industries
were also more dependent on government finance than other industries. Other
industries generally received very small shares of government loans and were not
especially dependent on the JDB as a result.
Rather than guiding growth through sizable investments in all industries
targeted for growth, as is often believed, initial Japanese government lending
priorities were a policy response to the needs of the early postwar economy.
Industries which provided important inputs or services for other industries, and which
needed very large amounts of loans, received the most support and in turn
depended the most on government lending. Postwar shipping capacity was limited
due to the loss of ships during World War II, and large government loans were
provided in the 1950s to replace these losses (37). Electric power received
considerable funds from the JDB for development of hydroelectric capacity and to
support the continued use of domestic coal in power generation (38) . Coal received
a sizable share of government financing in an effort to increase productivity and
lower costs so as to compete with imported oil and conserve foreign currency (39).
Iron and steel was given funds because of the importance of steel to other industries
as well as its potential as an export industry.
The "basic" industries, especially electric power and shipping, unquestionably
needed very large amounts of funds in the early postwar era, a time when private
banks were unable or in some cases probably reluctant to provide funding on the
scale needed. Nevertheless, three of four basic industries continued to receive
priority attention in the 1960s even after the early postwar justifications had
disappeared to a considerable degree. In the same period, several of the industries
targeted by government plans did not receive substantial government loans.
Automobiles received only a negligible portion of government bank loans, with a
resulting dependency ratio of less than one percent in the period in which it was a
"targeted" industry (40). Other machinery industries likewise failed to come near the
leading "infra-structure" industries in terms of either shares of JDB lending or levels
of dependency on government funds. Machinery industries, which including
automobile parts and machine tools, received $285 million while a "targeted" industry
in the 1960s and the computer industry was given $39 million in the 1960s when it
was targeted as part of electric machine industries (41). In contrast, loans provided
shipping, coal and the power industries totalled $3.64 billion between 1951 and 1969.
The allegedly superior, technocratically rational Japanese planners could not predict
market trends in these instances.
Several factors in addition to a concern for purely economic growth seem
involved in the setting of lending priorities. Government lending priorities and industry
dependencies on government loans imply that the "developmental state" was a
follower as much as a leader. Important policy instruments were as much problem as
"target" driven. The figures indicating dependency on government loans are
especially relevant here since they indicate where industries actually needed
government loans due to lack of available private sector funds. Government lending
in the early 1950s responded to the needs of infra-structure industries which required
very big investments at a time when capital was in short supply. Dependency on
government loans also reflected the size of risk involved in lending very large
amounts at a time when the future of the economy was uncertain. Commercial banks
were reluctant to make loans under these conditions. Later, as prosperity progressed
and the future looked more certain, industries were able to obtain commercial bank
loans more readily (42). Where there was a policy justification for support of particular
industries, and amounts of needed funds were huge, the government became a
lender of last resort. Once these lending patterns were established, they were hard to
change, either because of the large amounts involved in the loans, or, in the case of
the coal and shipping industries, because of an increasingly shaky economic
situation which enhanced risk and made commercial bank loans both harder to get
and more expensive, because of political pressures from the LDP, private enterprise
and labor and/or because of social policy concerns vis-a-vis unemployment (43).
The Japanese government's role in industrial lending was not negligible in
certain industries. However, government lending was not as massive as was
sometimes asserted. Many industries popularly believed to be heavily subsidized by
the Japanese state also received surprisingly small amounts of financial help.
Lending priorities reflected government responses to a variety of factors including
infra-structure needs as well as efforts to stimulate planned growth.
Further Evaluation the Japanese Government's Role in Economic Growth:
Industry Impact. The Japanese government's overall impact on economic growth
above and beyond its role in lending is itself a subject of controversy. Some
specialists point out that plan targets weren't reflected in subsequent economic reality
very well. Others cite government support for industries which became losers as well
as those which were winners and other unintended consequences. Still other studies
point out that economic policy goals other than high growth, such as state programs
for recessed industries and economic policies designed to satisfy LDP clients, often
outpaced high growth supports as a share of government subsidies.
Some research has discounted the direct effects of planning on economic
growth because there was often little fit between planned and actual outputs. Our
own comparison of economic plans with GNP figures shows that output was double
or more the size of GNP goals in each of the first four economic plan periods (44).
Production also deviated from plan goals in specific industries as is documented in
the case of the coal industry and machine tools. According to David Friedman,
"...Actual results varied wildly from plans. Output in 1960 was Y45 billion, or 225
percent of planned value, whereas output in 1965 was only 52 percent of the plan…."
Friedman also points out that targets for machine tool specialization were not met,
government loans correlated more with recessions  than growth, and government
plans for restructuring were not followed. Elsewhere, Richard Samuels has stated
that, "Government planners, who had failed completely to anticipate the recovery,
projected increasing demand for coal. They were off by 9 million tons" (45). Business
firms' response to economic cycles and general demand determined outputs in these
examples, not MITI policy. Under the kinds of circumstances just described some
Japanese economists have been loath to grant the plans a determinant role in
economic behavior. In the words of Toshimasa Tsuruta (46):
"...the modernization of the industrial structure, and the strengthening of
industrial competitiveness were not the result of industrial policy, but rather of
the relatively smooth operation of the price mechanism and the ability of firms
through their own decisions to adapt. The initial objectives of industrial policy
could not be realized, and they remained empty plans…."
Many commentators on Japanese economic policy have speculated as to the
government's ability to pick winners and allocate resources accordingly. Among the
industries supported by the Japanese government in the 1950s, iron and steel is
normally seen as a successful application of industrial policy (47). A variety of policy
tools -loans, tax incentives, protection and coordinated production and sales- were
used to stimulate modernization of facilities and stable supply and demand. Iron and
steel received $74.5 million in "rationalization" support from 1951-1965. While this
was a fairly small amount of money compared with the funds given power, coal and
shipping, it was still was considerably more than was given any other industry at this
time. The goal of policy was modernization of steelmaking processes so as to
improve productivity and lower prices. Lower prices in the steel industry were sought
to facilitate growth in domestic manufacturing industries which depended on steel
inputs. Lower prices would also lead to more competitive exports. Productivity did
increase in the 1950s and steel prices declined until the first oil crisis in 1973 (48).
One of the more interesting facets of Japanese industrial policy is the simple
fact that two of Japan's most highly successful industries, consumer electronics and
automobiles, were given very little government support relative to infra-structure and
later recessed industries. Consumer electronics received only $6 million in
government loans during the 1960s, and the government initially opposed technology
imports destined for this industry in the 1950s (49). The government role in the
automobile industry was mixed. Government lending provided 8 percent of the
industry's borrowing needs in 1955, but only between less than 1 percent and 2
percent in most other years (50). Tax incentives, government allocated technology
imports and protection have been seen as having a modest positive effect on the
industry in the 1950s and 1960s. Still, government policies (especially protectionist
barriers) are believed to have played a relatively modest role relative to other
economic factors including high world demand, cheap gasoline in the United States
and improvement of the Japanese road system (51). Perhaps the most important
government supports given Japan's automobile industry were the loans and other
incentives provided auto parts producers, since these encouraged cost-saving and
quality-invoking technological innovations in medium and small firms which provided
inputs for the assembly lines of large firme (52).
Support for the Japanese computer industry is also evaluated as having
positive effects on the industry's development by some persons. Nevertheless, the
overall evaluation of government computer policy is somewhat mixed like that of
industrial policy in general. Early in the development of the computer industry the
government allowed IBM to enter the Japanese market in exchange for sharing of
technology with Japanese firms (53) . Early support of technology induction was
accompanied by establishment in 1969 of a quasi-government firm (JECC) to lease
Japanese computers to end users (54). This measure was a direct response to IBM's
major instrument of market development for mainframe computers and resulted in a
stable, predictable demand for Japanese-made computers. Government
procurement of Japanese computers for public offices and universities had a similar
effect. Government support for high visibility cooperative government-private sector R
and D projects is also seen as having been generally beneficial to the computer
industry and its various spinoffs (55). Nevertheless, on the negative side, a
government emphasis on hardware development at the expense of promotion of
systems design and software innovation has been seen as contributing to Japanese
industry lags in these areas.
Some appraisals of industrial policy assert as a general principle that the
Japanese government did well in growing industries but poorly in those which were
declining. The state of coal and shipping after several years of government priority
support seems to support this view. Imported crude oil became cheaper than coal
produced in Japan beginning in the late 1950s. Substantial government loans and
other incentives were provided the coal industry after that time in efforts to raise
productivity to levels which would make coal competitive with oil so as to reduce the
pressure of demand for oil imports on foreign currency reserves. The coal programs
were also a response to political pressures on the behalf of labor, the mining districts
and the mining firms (56). In coal's waning days in the 1960s and 1970s, funds were
thus allocated in part as a social policy response to unemployment in coal mining
regions.
The long and somewhat tortuous road taken by Japan's postwar shipping
and shipbuilding industries was generally a similar story to that for coal. Initial
government policies helped Japanese shipping get back on their feet after heavy
wartime losses. The belief that Japan should have its own merchant ships was strong
on both security and economic grounds. Shipbuilding was helped by this program
and was for two decades a world leader due to its low production costs (57).
However, from the 1970s on shipping was usually an inefficient, high cost and,
therefore, uncompetitive industry. Government supports thereafter were a response
to political pressures and the desire to maintain a Japanese flag merchant fleet (58).
Shipbuilding also declined in competitiveness in the 1970s, in part because of
competition from low-cost shipbuilders in Korea and elsewhere. Government
shipbuilding policies in the 1970s and 1980s followed a recessed industry more than
a development model as a result (59). Business, labor and LDP politicians were
active in seeking funds for both industries. Policies in these two declining industry
sectors also indicate the presence of alternative government goals to growth.
Of the industries targeted for support in the 1950s and 1960s electric power
is not normally evaluated in terms of success or failure. Electricity outputs kept up
with growth in most periods, and the industry can be seen as performing its
infrastructure role credibly for this reason. It was this infrastructure argument plus the
high costs later of nuclear power development which led the Japan Development
Bank to continue disproportionately high levels of support for this industry. However,
Japan still has higher electricity rates than other industrialized countries (60).
Supportive Economic, Social and Political Institutions . In a recent study of
British, French and German economic policy, Peter Hall attributed distinctive policy
effects in the different countries to broad "institutional" patterns in their respective
political economies. Institutions in this instance are patterns of behavior in
government and economic markets and also in society itself (61). A similar
institutional inventory can be suggested for Japan. Several aspects of Japan's
society, economy and political experience seem on logical grounds to have favored
the country's high growth. Alternatively, they did not act as an obstacle to
development even if they did not play a specifically supportive role. Econometric
research supports the importance to growth of some of the institutional patterns to be
discussed; others are more speculative (62):
a) Savings and Investment. Japan's savings rate was very high during most
of the postwar era as was already discussed. Although fairly low in the years
immediately following World War II, personal savings rates increased to a peak of
15% in 1970-1974. Corporate savings followed more or less a similar trajectory, but
peaked in the 1960s high growth era (63). So did gross savings which includes
government and corporate savings in addition to individual savings (see again Table
2)(64).
Investment was also very high in Japan in comparison with other countries,
even though even Japan's high savings were sometimes inadequate for investment
needs (65). Corporate savings were directly applied to investments in plant,
equipment or technology, or in some cases reduction of a firm's financial dependency
on bank loans (66). Individual savings were themselves marshalled through postal
savings or bank accounts to provide funding opportunities through the
FILP-government bank connection or the commercial banking system.
The relative abundance of savings and the relatedly high levels of investment
are normally seen as one of the most significant forces in postwar Japanese growth.
Some scholars see these twin factors as the leading factor in development. However,
while most persons grant the importance of investment and saving, disagreement is
common as to the government role in their stimulation. Nobody would argue against
the idea that the Japanese governments' conservative fiscal policies increased the
share of wealth which could be potentially allocated to savings and investment. But
the assertion by some experts that government policy stimulated investment by
lowering interest on loans to industry below levels in other countries has been
challenged by economic research. Interest rates on loans in Japan have been lower
in some periods but this is said to reflect an abundance of savings more than
government monetary policy (67). Also, government authorized tax exemptions on
savings deposits are similarly said to have had little effect according to recent
economic studies, despite widespread assertions to the contrary (68).
The government role in lending to industry is another example of policies
whose importance and impact are debated. Given the central role of borrowing
relative to equity in Japanese corporate practice, the role of bank lending in
investments leading to modernization and expansion was critical. However,
commercial institutions provided most of the investment funds in most industries at
most times, as we have seen. This fact notwithstanding, government indicative
lending could still have had an unusual leverage effect, given corporations' typical
dependence on debt rather than equity (69). Several scholars have asserted that this
is what took place. Government bank loans are believed to have been of special
indicative significance, especially in the early postwar years (70).
Many economists judge that government lending did not play a direct
indicative role. We have already cited the limiting effects on government bank lending
produced by an early bias for power, coal and shipping. Other factors such as the
complexity of bank lending decisions and the increasing availability of loans to all
industries as growth advanced have also been cited as evidence in arguments
against seeing government bank loans as having indicative effects (71). In addition,
FILP related funds were used increasingly over time to support general infrastructure
development (roads, ports, industrial parks, etc.) and other priority concerns. Lending
to "targeted" growth industries generally failed to reach significant indicative levels,
other things being equal, as a result.
The alleged limitations on the government's direct role in lending to industry
seem credible. However, evaluating Japanese economic policy is much like the
proverbial peeling of an artichoke; as each leaf is removed, still another layer is
discovered. In this case, one of Japan's leading economists has argued that
government bank borrowing was seen by firms as a safety net, and that corporate
investment strategies were unusually daring as a result (72). Firms could in effect
take risks on the assumption that the government would bail them out if this led to
problems, In this sense, the FILP and related government lending institutions could
have had a substantial, positive impact on growth.
b) A second significant institutional pattern in postwar growth was the high
level of competitiveness of Japanese firms. Aggressive inter-firm competition is cited
frequently as a causal factor in economic analyses of industry successes, even
though it is not easily measured other than by anecdotal information (73). However,
some aspects of Japanese experience, such as the substantial frequency among
both small and large enterprises of deviations or defections from inter-firm cartel
agreements regarding capacity allocation and other matters suggest themselves as
indicators of competitiveness. David Friedman offers the following example of the
difficulties in getting firms to cooperate in the machine tool industry (74):
"Though this draft was substantial progress toward an agreement, some
gyokai members balked again... Intercompany mistrust was the main
obstacle...changes in gyokai membership further confused
matters...Outsiders, of course, were under no obligation to observe the
restraint agreement...In some segments of the machine tool market outsider
firms were the largest single manufacturers".
High levels of inter-firm competition are said by some to reflect postwar
structural change, especially the breakup of the zaibatsu holding companies and the
new Anti-Monopoly Law's sanctions against excessive concentration and illegal
cartels (75). Individual companies' desire for the benefits accruing from market
domination is another likely correlate of competitiveness. These included tangible
benefits such as greater economies of scale and perhaps greater certainty as to the
demand for a firm's output. Less tangible rewards such as the higher status assigned
to dominant firms also exist in hierarchy conscious Japan. Firm competitiveness may
also have reflected other forces. Other factors such as strong in-group attachments
in a society where in and out-group (uchi-soto) distinctions are important, company
loyalties reflecting lifetime employment in the same firm and keiretsu traditions of
feudal clan-like loyalties to groupings of firms are also sometimes cited as
explanations of high competition levels. Lifetime employment also means that
significant portions of the large enterprise work force depend on firms' survival and
growth, another potent reason for aggressive firm behavior.
Inter-firm competitiveness at a time of high economic expectations was likely
a major factor in growth, and may help explain the Japanese economy's tendency in
some periods to quickly surpass planned output goals. However, competitiveness
also had potentially negative effects. Competitive capacity expansion in the steel
industry ultimately led to excess capacity in that sector. The same forces appear at
work in the Japanese automobile industry today. The tendency to strong inter-firm
competitiveness was rightly or wrongly one of the motivations (in addition to a desire
simply to create larger firms) behind MITI planners' efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to
promote mergers in the automobile and computer industries (76). Controlling
allegedly destructive competitiveness was also a government concern in policies
toward medium and small businesses.
c) The character of Japan's labor markets has been relevant in various ways
to Japan's development potential. Until the late 1960s there were enough persons in
the labor market, including young people who left parental homes in the
low-efficiency agricultural and small firm sector for jobs in large firms, to permit rapid
economic expansion without accompanying strong pressure on wages (77). Money
saved on labor costs could, ceter paribus, be invested to improve firm productivity or
expand capacity, a condition which obviously facilitated economic growth. However,
since the late 1960s there have been periodic labor shortages. A variety of practices,
including employment of larger numbers of middle-aged women, postponement of
the retirement age, and illegal immigration, have alleviated labor shortages at various
junctures. Over the long term, the shortage of labor will probably be an important
factor limiting growth in its traditional forms and favoring structural change in the
Japanese economy.
The relative quiescence of private sector labor relations should also be seen
as contributing to Japan's growth potential. Enterprise unionism and lifetime
employment are parts of a system in which labor's fate was identified with the
success or failure of the firm. These practices and the associated tendency for
workers to engage in mainly short "symbolic" strikes made it possible for firms to
adopt long-term strategies with some certainty as to the availability and cost of labor
in the foreseeable future (78).
Economy-wide "patterned bargaining" is a standard practice in Japan. Still,
the existence of enterprise unions encouraged sensitivity to a specific firm's condition
in labor-management negotiations. Inclusion of lower levels of management in
enterprise unions also made it possible for union members to know the firm's actual
economic situation, which was another factor permitting labor demands to be "fine
tuned" to company conditions. Under such conditions, sustained labor disruptions
which would undermine a company's market viability were usually avoided. Lifetime
employment also made technological change less of a threat to the work force, which
could in times of expanding markets and production count on continued employment
while benefitting from firm growth. Process innovations such as quality circles, which
are believed to have facilitated training and productivity growth, were also facilitated
by labor cooperation (79).
d) Japan has long been known for its dual economic structure, wherein small
firms are more numerous and occupy a larger role in the economy than in other
industrialized countries (80). Often the small firm sector is seen as inefficient,
However in some industries small firms are believed to have excelled in flexible
manufacturing. According to the flexible manufacturing hypothesis, small firms in
industries like machine tools have been able to rapidly adjust their output to changing
conditions and to flexibly produce different products to take advantage of market
"niches" of varying kinds (81). Elsewhere in the economy, small supplier firms are
said to serve as a cushion to large firms by allowing the larger firms to reduce labor
costs. This is often said to be the practice in such assembly dominated industries as
automobiles. In some cases small supplier firms are said to also absorb the effects of
economic downturns, albeit this is recognized to occur at considerable social cost
(82).
e) Rapid postwar economic growth in the industrialized world plus an
international commitment to free trade also facilitated Japanese growth in the 1950s
and 1960s. Japan's growth in the entire postwar era depended on her ability to sell
sufficient amounts of products abroad to pay for raw material imports needed for a
growing economy. A free trade regime made this possible. Also, while Japan's early
postwar growth reflected the pull of internal demand for industrial equipment and
consumer durables, in some later years exports were the locomotive of growth (83).
This was the case during the sustained domestic recessions of the 1970s (84).
f) Japan's dynamic growth may in some areas also reflect the Japanese
government's limited direct ownership role in the economy compared with postwar
Europe. All of Japan's telecommunications and the major international Japanese air
carrier were government owned until the privatization of the mid-1980s. So was much
of the Japanese railway system. All long-distance lines were publicly owned,
although there were private rail and subway operations in the largest cities. But
comparability with Europe stops at this point. Unlike the French government, Japan
had no nationalized banks. Nor did Japan's government own or manage
manufacturing and production facilities in economic sectors such as iron and steel,
electric power, petroleum refining and automobiles, whereas one or another of these
industries was wholly or partly publicly owned and operated at some time in postwar
France, Britain, Germany and Italy (85). The modest direct role of the Japanese state
is not well appreciated abroad, where a much more substantial level of government
intervention is usually assumed to exist.
Levels of government ownership were thus limited in Japan compared with
other major economies (86). (The United States is an exception, and Japan looked
somewhat more like a typical European government until recently. But the United
States is a notable outlier among advanced nations on the dimension of public
ownership). After the mid-1980s the Japanese government's direct role in the
economy was further limited by privatization of the national railways, Japan Air Lines
and Nippon Telephone and Telegraph. (The government still owns major portions of
the stock in the divested companies. Complete de facto separation has been slow
due to lack of market interest in the privatized firms' stocks. Still, the management of
the firms, their relationships with labor and their ties with other firms are radically
different from before privatization.) Finally, while the Japanese government has
played a prominent and to some observers fairly important role in technology
development since the early 1970s through sponsorship of high profile research
projects, government investments in "R and D" are also lower than those in most
other major industrialized countries (87). To the extent that Japanese government
intervention was (a) confined to "normal" infra-structure development and
maintenence, and (b) followed the market as to industrial policy, Japan arguably
profited from the absence of the inefficiencies sometimes attributed to European
public ownership.
g) Japan's political stability under conservative rule created a favorable
environment for growth. First and foremost, stable conservative rule in the 1950s
assured private sector leadership that the economy would not be nationalized or
cooperativized, as was advocated by the Socialist and Communist parties at that
time. Conservative dominance also assured business that political leadership would
possess values generally receptive to business interests viewed broadly (88). Stable
political expectations further made it possible for firms to develop long-term business
strategies without fears that important government regulations and tax policies would
suddenly change. The importance of all of these conditions could be seen in frequent
business group condemnations of conservative party leadership when this supportive
environment seemed to be on the brink of political collapse through conservative
party ineptitude (89).
h) Japan's social homogeneity is also a plausible factor contributing to
economic growth. Social class has never been as important a cleavage in Japan as
in Western Europe. A variety of reasons, among them egalitarianism in educational
opportunity and military service dating as far back as the late 1800s, can be cited for
this state of affiars. The parochial nature of Japanese society may also be relevant,
since outbreaks of class conflict in rural communities during the Tokugawa and
pre-war periods never developed into national movements. Cleavages based on
religious differences have been similarly muted in the modem period, while
regionalism declined significantly as a major political force after the Meiji reformation
(90).
Postwar Japan thus did not have the profound social cleavages of inter-war
Europe -the more relevant point for comparison in terms of relative political
development. Postwar Japanese governments were able to focus on the goal of
growth relatively unimpeded by the kinds of major political conflicts such as occurred
at times in other more cleavage ridden political systems (91). The Socialist and other
opposition parties and their trade union allies tried valiantly to arouse a widespread
class consciousness in Japan. While their mobilizational efforts supported a
parliamentary opposition to the dominant conservatives, class struggles did not
dominate policy agendas as they did at times in inter-war Europe, or even postwar
Britain in the 1970s. Relative social homogeneity and the absence of a class
cleavage, plus conservative rule, was also one of several factors allowing the
Japanese state to postpone some of the costs of a modem social welfare system
until after high growth was well on its way. The enormous social and political costs of
an American-style under-class have also obviously been avoided.
i) Economic models of Japan's growth recognize that Japan's high literacy
and education levels at the end of World War II were themselves important inputs in
initial postwar growth. Later, as households became more affluent, greater numbers
of sons and daughters were able to finish high school and/or college, which further
enhanced the skiff potentials of the labor force (92).
Unanticipated Consequences: Subversion, Non-Compliance and “Irrational”
Outcomes. Japanese government economic policies sometimes had unintended
consequences. Business cycles intervened to upset the calculations of particular
plans and industrial policy frameworks (93). Furthermore, despite high levels of
business-government communication and an asserted corporatist consensus on
economic policy, case studies indicate frequent private sector resistance to
government policy proposals and programs, Private firms also exploited and
manipulated government policies in ways that were not congenial to government
intentions. Companies in some instances totally evaded government policy
directives. As a result, many of the Japanese government's industrial supports
cannot be seen as fully successful from the point of view of government intentions.
Examples of private sector exploitation of government programs are easy to
find in the cases where detailed policy analysis has been conducted. For example,
subsidies provided coal companies under the 1947 Priority Production Program did
little to improve mine efficiency, which was one of the goals of the program. Coal
firms mined marginal fields because the higher production costs there were paid by
the government under the existing programs. Mining firms saved their better fields for
future use when costs would not to be subsidized (94). Under the same program,
government funds to encourage coal firms to install productivity enhancing
equipment were diverted to stockpile new equipment until after cost-based
renumeration ended (95). Later, the 1955 coal rationalization plan goal of retiring
inefficient mines was subverted when firms sold old, depleted mines to the
government while simultaneously opening new facilities without regard to their
efficiency (96). Moreover, in some periods, large mining companies even bought coal
from small-scale, less efficient firms in order to take advantage of high prices while
simultaneously receiving government supports designed to enhance their own
efficiency (97).
Other industries displayed similar patterns to those in coal. In the textile
industry, government programs set up to purchase old equipment for the purpose of
curtailing capacity were subverted in much the same way as in the coal industry.
Textile makers kept obsolete machinery which they would have normally abandoned
in the hope that it would be purchased by the government under purchase-and-scrap
programs (98). Elsewhere, government directives to machine tool makers regarding
product concentration and other kinds of cooperation were often ignored while
production responded much more to market demand than government plans (99).
Resistance to MITI's plans for industrial re-structuring in the automobile and
computer industries is also well-known. So are defections from MITI supervised steel
capacity plans in both the 1950s and 1960s (100). Capacity increases in the steel
industry thus reflected intense inter-firm competition for market share rather than
government supported cooperation. Other examples of defections from policy
intentions at the firm level indicate that Japanese economic policymaking usually
encompasses a rich diversity of motivations and often has multiple unintended
consequences. It has long been thought that government policies should be easier to
implement where the number of firms is small (as in steel, automobiles and
computers) relative to those like machine tools where there are many firms. However,
it is equally obvious that firms in all industries resist government technocrats when it
suits them to do so.
It is also important to realize that government endorsed economic growth had
negative effects on the quality of Japanese life in the postwar era as well as making
positive contributions to real incomes and shared affluence. Japan is a crowded
nation with extremely little space, and ranks with Korea, Indonesia, the Netherlands,
and Belgium as one of the most heavily populated places on earth. Japan's
population concentration is especially burdensome in large cities and their
surrounding regions. For example, Tokyo prefecture's population density in 1990 was
5,430 persons per square kilometer, a figure dramatically higher than the national
average of 332. Population movement to the cities and development of regional
industrial centers in the 1950s and 1960s brought enormous crowding to already
overcrowded areas.
Urban overcrowding was one major consequence of high growth about which
not very much can be done beyond regional de-concentration of industry and service
centers. Population increases in the cities and suburbs had many consequences.
Japan has one of the best urban rapid transit systems in the world, and made many
improvements in train and subway lines in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet growth and
urbanization meant no end to overcrowding of trains and long commuting times.
Statistics are inadequate indicators of the scale of this problem. Persons living as far
as two hours from Tokyo must scramble for standing space on trains during the rush
hour. Roads and highways are also enormously overcrowded much like urban rapid
transit. Even though Japan's government has spent a great deal on highway
construction, the proportion of paved roads in Japan still ranks substantially below
that for other major industrialized countries.
Japan's waste disposal and utilities systems are also hard put to keep up
with demand, and showed signs of stress well before those in the United States.
Compared with other industrialized countries, Japan also lags in sewage disposal
facilities. In 1973 only 31 percent of Japanese homes had flush toilets, in contrast
with figures above 90 percent in Britain, the United States, France, Sweden and
West Germany. Even in 1989, only 42 percent of homes in Japan were connected to
sewer lines, whereas the figures for other advanced industrial countries were
substantially higher (101).
Conditions in Osaka, Tokyo and other major cities are much better than the
national average, but the national comparisons are still important indicators of
nationwide lags in performance. Finally, Japan's cities have relatively little space for
parks, and the growth of urban populations brought even lower ratios of park land
per-capita than had been the case previously. In 1989, there were only 2.5 square
meters of park space per resident in Tokyo, compared to 37 in Bonn, 30 in London,
and 24 in Chicago (102).
Deficiencies in transport and social capital were matched by a growing
pollution problem which surfaced in the nation's attention in the late 1960s. With most
of its population and all of its industrialized centers concentrated on only 20 percent
of its land, Japan by the early 1970s had the highest concentration of industrial
output and energy use per kilometer in the industrialized world (Table 5). The figures
were substantially greater than in Europe, which is also crowded, and dramatically
higher than in the more sparsely populated United States. Japan also had severe
water pollution problems at times, including some even in the nineteenth century.
The painful consequences of overcrowding of Japan's urban and industrial districts
became very obvious by the late 1960s and early 1970s, as high growth brought
more factories, cars, and homes to the country's most heavily populated areas and
even began to spread the polluting effects of industrial growth to remote parts of the
archipelago through regional industrialization. As trees died and as birds fled the
cities and as people suffered from air, water, noise, and even "sunshine pollution"
-the shutting off of direct sunlight by construction of high-rise apartments- a myriad of
local citizen movements opposed to pollution and regional growth sprung up around
the country.
One of the immutables of Japan's physical setting is the shortage of usable
land and space. The land-population ratio is reflected very directly in pollution
problems. It is also at the root of severe overcrowding and astronomical land prices.
Land speculation has made the costs of land even higher. Neither of these problems
were new to Japan, but during the high growth period they became much more
acute. In 1963, the average dwelling had just under four rooms and a total area of
72.5 square meters (roughly 24 by 27 feet). Twenty five years later there had been a
20 percent increases in the size of homes. Construction of slightly larger homes and
shrinkage of family size resulted in an even greater increase in space per person.
Whereas each person had a little over 7 square meters of space in 1963, by 1989 it
was 12 square meters (103). While this growth was salutary, Japan was still an
extremely crowded place by comparative standards, and population pressure on
housing was a constant problem. In most years in the 1970s and the 1980s, land
price inflation considerably exceeded general inflation trends. In addition, in
comparative terms, both land and housing prices were and remain extremely high in
Japan. In 1979 one square meter of residential land in Tokyo cost on the average
$43 thousand, roughly the cost of a typical 1500 square meter lot in an expensive
suburb in many cities in the United States in the same year. Even in remote areas
like the southern island of Kyushu, a square meter of land cost roughly $15
thousand. Meanwhile, the cost of houses soared to a multiple of seven times annual
income in the late 1980s, and many married couples were unable to purchase homes
until their mid-forties, if indeed they were able to buy them then (104).
Because of the chronic shortage and high cost of homes, demand for public
housing in Japan was consistently high despite considerable national and local
expenditures on housing over the years. For example, applications for housing units
in public projects ranged from eight to eighty-five requests for one vacancy in Tokyo
in the early 1970s (with the different ratios depending on the cost and type of
housing)(105). Housing therefore joins other social capital investments as a major
lingering problem for government in Japan.
Economic Welfare, Clientelism and the Crisis and Compensation Hypothesis.
Much of political economy research on Japan has described and sought explanations
for that country's phenomenal postwar growth. However, not all of Japan's industries
have been successful at all times. The coal industry lost competitiveness in the late
1950s and one or another segment of the textile industry had problems virtually
throughout the postwar period. Several major industries, including shipbuilding, iron
and steel, petrochemicals and aluminum, were "structurally depressed" in the 1970s
and sometimes later as the result of the oil crises' effects on production costs and
demand (especially the demand for ships). Competition from newly industrializing
countries including Korea and Taiwan also affected demand for some Japanese
products. The shipping industry was itself also intermittently in bad straits, as was
described earlier (106).
In each of these examples of industrial decline, the Japanese government
responded with measures such as capacity reductions (frequently including
government purchase of excess equipment), employee retraining and efforts for
regional economic renewal. In some periods, the government orchestrated remedial
programs involving labor force and facilities reductions, anti-recession cartels, and
special recovery loans. At times, industries which employed as many as one out of
every five of Japanese workers were affected. Medium and small businesses, many
of which were chronically weak financially (although some also did quite well through
modernization programs), also received a substantial amount of government support
throughout much of the postwar era.
The magnitude of attention given weak and sick industries by Japan's
postwar governments is shown by the numbers of major policies and amounts of
resources allocated to address their problems. Figure 6 shows the numbers of MITI
plans and programs dedicated to growth industries contrasted -with proposed
solutions for problem sectors, and thus indicates in a rough sense the degree of
policy concern for each area. The source is annual ministry policy reports. Table 6 in
turn shows the amounts of FILP program funds allocated to small business loans
compared with lending to large business. Quite a bit of the financial support given
small business addressed temporary or long-term economic woes in particular small
firm sectors. Substantial funds were also supplied for modernization of small firms
through the introduction of automated equipment and other improvements. The two
goals are not mutually exclusive.
What is striking about these two sets of data is how much attention has been
paid to less economically promising economic sectors compared with support for
successful industries. Almost as much attention was paid to problem industries as to
growth sectors. One hundred twenty five growth programs were cited in annual
ministry reports between 1955 and 1980, but there were also 109 recession policies.
If the purpose of market interventions, a third category of MITI actions in our
information, was known in all instances, recession programs might outnumber growth
frameworks (107).
Quantitative data on allocations of FILP loans to "basic industries" (the large
firm growth sector) and medium and small businesses tell a similar story. By the
mid-1960s Japanese governments were spending twice as much or more on small
business as on large firm development. Later even larger disparities could be
observed. Although it is true that not all small businesses were economic disasters,
many small business programs were remedial in nature. One might conclude that
Japan's role as an "economic welfare" state is as important as its role as a
"developmental state".
Information from the 1960s and 1970s regarding the timing of government
loans relative to production growth and value added in the production process (Table
7) tells a similar story as to the relationship between industry success or failure and
government policy response. In industries like automobiles, precision instruments
and consumer electronics the proportion of Japan Development Bank loans
remained low throughout the postwar era. Borrowing from the JDB also declined in
most periods relative to both gross output and value added, which implies that firms
needed less from government banks as they became more successful and efficient
(108). In contrast, in troubled industries such as iron and steel and non-ferrous
metals, the patterns of dependence on government borrowing were actually
reversed. Over time borrowing from the JDB increased as a share of all borrowing;
dependence on JDB loans also increased in relationship to output and value added.
Since we lacked data on the 1950s, we could not analyze periods when JDB lending
had different implications. But with this exception, the figures tell a remarkable story
of government responsiveness to industry difficulties relative to industry successes.
Japan as a Politically Clientelistic State. The idea of seeing Japan as an
economic welfare state is very appealing. The degree of attention paid to sustaining
employment during hard times in industries affected by oil price "shocks," cyclical
downturns, high yen influenced declines in export sales, removal of protective tariffs
and quotas and other factors is impressive. But Japan under Liberal Democratic rule
is also a "clientelistic state". Many programs targeted at weak economic sectors are
motivated by a political concern for aiding conservative party supporters as much as
for other reasons. Quite a few scholars would even say that clientelism supersedes
welfare in importance as a motivation. Interest groups, individual Dietmembers and
intra-LDP policy "families" actively seek help from the government on behalf of
traditional LDP clients such as farmers and small business. Representatives of
constituencies where recessed industries are located also ask for help, often in the
form of public works outlays which favor another LDP client, the construction
industry. Much of Japan's domestic policy agenda is affected by their actions (109).
Japanese farmers are another major LDP client and have done unusually
well compared with large industry throughout the postwar era (see Table 6). If
support for farm programs is added to the amounts provided medium and small
business, the enormous size of Japan's role as some combination of "economic
welfare" and "clientelistic" state becomes clear. Outlays to clients or "welfare" sectors
have always exceeded amounts provided for economic growth by a ratio of from 3:1
to 6:1. The popular image of Japan as a developmental state obviously needs some
qualification.
Recent research has modified earlier images which ignored or failed to give
detailed attention to the clientelistic and welfare oriented aspects of the Japanese
political economy. Kent Calder, in particular, has pointed to the importance of LDP
clientelism and developed a challenging thesis as to its timing (110). Calder's general
thesis that clientelism is an important driving force in the Japanese political economy
is well supported by data on government support for different economic sectors, as
was shown.
Calder has also proposed a "crisis and compensation" hypothesis that
suggests LDP electoral losses and internal party conflict were a driving force in
sporadically intensified attention to client oriented programs. Expansions of supports
for farmers, small business, social welfare and public works are asserted to reflect
these feelings of LDP electoral vulnerability and possible internal breakdown.
The "crisis and compensation" hypothesis is important to understanding of
the LDPs strategies to stay in power. Table 8 contains budget and loan data relevant
to the crisis and compensation concept. Japanese government allocations over time
to public works, small business, agriculture and social welfare are noted as are
indicators for political and economic crises. Two kinds of results are notable. First,
public works appear to be insensitive to political crises as defined by Calder. Public
works outlays systematically increased in the 1960s compared with the 1950s.
However, expanded public works outlays in the 1960s did not correlate directly with
crises and were probably as much a reflection of increased revenues and other
factors as manifestations of a crisis response. Concern for infrastructure
development grew in Japan as high growth proceeded, and there was considerable
infrastructure investment in anticipation of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. Japanese
leaders at this time were concerned that their country make a good appearance in
the face of world attention. Thereafter public works displayed a trajectory more
readily explainable by incrementalist models of budgeting than as a response to
crises (111). The only unusual deviation in expenditures for public works after the
1960s took place in the early 1970s and appears to have been a response to a
severe economic downturn at the tail end of the high growth era in 1970-1971.
Programs destined for the small business and farm sectors also showed little
apparent crisis sensitivity, with the possible exception of the growing attention paid to
these sectors beginning in the mid-to-late 1950s. After this increase, incrementalism
seems as plausible a macro-explanation for the trends in allocations to these sectors
indicated in Table 8 as any other policy motivation. Even the 1950s and 1960s
increases in support for farmers and small businesses defies easy analysis as a
crisis response. Many institutional patterns of Japan's postwar political economy
were only emerging at that time. The enactment of several broad legislative
packages for farmers and small businesses in these years reflected both the
increased organizational power of the relevant interest groups and the resolution or
abandonment of 1950s ideological issues (112). The late 1950s and early 1960s
were also a time of both increasing tax revenues and urban recovery, both of which
permitted devoting political attention to lagging rural incomes. The Japanese political
economy shows strong effects of clientelism, but crises seem a less credible factor in
the timing of these responses than other plausible causes (113).
Social welfare outlays did increase at a time of structural change in Japanese
society and related LDP electoral losses. As is well known, economic growth from the
1960s on was accompanied by rapid urban and suburban population increase. Farm
family sons and daughters moved to cities while parents remained behind on the
farm. Many persons moved to city apartments too small to accommodate aged
parents. The proportion of elderly living with their children declined because of these
trends, at the same time that the proportion of older people in the population was on
the increase. In some senses, jobs in industry and services, which increased in
number as the economy grew, also provided less security than traditional rural life.
The LDP itself experienced substantial electoral losses as the population
became more mobile and persons with urban occupations (and therefore often
opposition party attachments) spilled out of the cities into surrounding areas. The
LDP's loss to opposition party candidates of many city mayorships and urban
prefecture governorships was especially vexing. Opposition control of local
governments itself led to expansion of social welfare services in a number of
important cases. The political events in local politics and structural change created a
window of opportunity for policy change. However, it was mainly bureaucrats and not
LDP leaders who took advantage of this opening to propose significant increases in
medical insurance coverage for the aged and other social welfare system
improvements (114).
Trade Successes, Trade Issues,  Liberalization and the Partial Dismantling of
the Developmental State . Indicative economic planning has continued in Japan
although the rhetoric of plans from the mid-1960s on increasingly has stressed
economic stability and quality of life. The Japanese economy also grew in-most years
even though growth rates in the 1970s and 1980s were considerably lower than
those of the 1960s. Moreover, Japan's economic growth during the 1970s was
uneven in different industries. Industries such as automobiles and electronics were
highly successful while others like iron and steel underwent a "structural" recession.
Foreign trade, which had prospered during the high growth period, continued to
flourish in the 1970s but with a different product mix. Automobiles and consumer
electronics were more prominent while shipbuilding and iron and steel, which had
been 1950s and 1960s leaders, declined in importance.
Japan's role in world trade has grown at levels matching her domestic
economic growth. In 1958 Japan's total exports were a nominal $2.8 billion. By 1975
foreign trade had grown to $55 billion, in 1980 it was $127 billion and by 1990 the
trade figure was 287 billion dollars. Exports quadrupled in the 1970s and doubled
once again in the 1980s. Reflecting these figures, Japan's share of total world trade
increased from around 3 percent in 1960 to 12 percent in 1990. While inflation in oil
prices and enormous growth in the value of petroleum trade changed the structure of
world commerce and depressed markets in many countries during the 1970s,
Japan's foreign sales of some products continued to boom (115).
Japan's postwar trade success was predicated on free and expanding world
commerce. Increased external demand for Japanese products was also important.
Expanded trade levels permitted Japan to import the raw materials necessary to fuel
high growth, satisfy new food preferences among the Japanese population and pay
its huge oil bills in the 1970s. Exports were also the motor driving economic growth in
the 1970s and in part of the 1980s. At the same time, the success of Japanese
products like color television sets, automobiles, and high quality steel produced
adverse reactions in other countries and created political problems for Japan's
government.
The long-tem growth of Japan's foreign trade was in some senses a mixed
blessing. Japan's success in foreign markets led to requests for opening of Japan's
domestic market for manufactures as early as the 1960s. Even though in many years
Japan has an adverse trade balance as the result of the huge internal demand for
imported energy and other industrial needs, success in selected export markets
resulted in adverse reactions. Foreign governments including the United States
deplored Japan's then high tariffs and numerous import quotas. The Japanese
government responded to these requests over time by lowering tariffs, eliminating
import quotas (see Table 9) and freeing foreign investments in Japanese industries.
Usually these actions elicited strong support from Japan's major big business
organization, the Federation of Economic Organizations, but strong opposition from
individual industries affected by the changes (116). By the mid-1970s only a handful
of products were still protected by import quotas, and, as in other advanced
countries, most of these were farm goods. Also, by 1980 Japan's average tariffs were
below those of the United States and the EEC (117). In at least formal terms, Japan's
economy was open to the world in most product areas.
Despite formal liberalization Japan has continued to be a target of criticism in
trade disputes with the United States and other countries. Businessmen and
politicians abroad responded to continuing and often expanding trade deficits with
Japan by accusing that country of continuing to maintain import barriers. After Japan
had reduced or eliminated most of its formal quotas and tariff barriers, criticisms from
abroad focused on alleged non-tariff barriers like inspection procedures, domestic
commodity taxes and government procurement policies. In the case of textiles, steel,
color television sets and automobiles, foreign requests led the Japanese government
to impose restrictions on exports to specific countries or regions. However, trade
deficits with Japan persisted in both the United States and Europe (and even grew in
some instances). Trade issues continued to dominate Japan's relationships with
other advanced countries as the 1980s went on. Japan's domestic political agenda is
also affected by these disputes, as the discussion of rice liberalization issues and
Large Store Law reform bears witness.
Japan has always been heavily dependent on foreign raw materials to supply
its industries, and many have marveled at Japan's economic success in the face of
such a pronounced native shortage of industrial minerals and energy sources.
Maintenence of adequate levels of exports to pay for raw material and energy
imports has long been a government and private sector concern, as has also been a
concern for dependable sources of supply, Japan's foreign trade policy in the 1950s
was oriented toward securing adequate supplies of foreign raw materials and
maintenance of export levels sufficient to pay for these needed imports. As the
postwar Japanese economy grew, and imports of even larger volumes of foreign raw
materials became necessary, the concern for having secure foreign sources of
supply accelerated. The two 1970s oil crises brought further acute realization of the
importance of secure sources of needed resources among policymakers. In a
significant shift in priorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in 1973 that
henceforth secure access to raw materials would be a driving concern in Japan's
diplomacy. In a related series of events, the economic ministries joined the foreign
ministry and private sector interests to promote policies aimed at development of
overseas sources of raw materials. Japan signed agreements with the USSR on (a)
natural gas development in the Yakutsk basin in 1973, (b) development of Siberia in
1974, and (c) rights to off-shore oil deposits near Russian Sakhalin in 1975. Similarly,
Japan made loans to oil-rich Abu Dhabi, lent money for development of natural gas in
Indonesia, and signed an economic cooperation agreement with Iran, followed later
by a government-supported oil refinery project in that country. Rights over off-shore
oil deposits in the East China Sea and elsewhere also became major issues between
Japan, the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of
China government on Taiwan as all of the countries in the Northwest Pacific realized
the urgency of their energy needs. Elsewhere efforts were made to secure access to
minerals and coal from Australia and other countries through private sector
investments and initiatives.
Japan's policy support for industrial growth, structural change and technology
induction through policy frameworks and government incentives declined over time
as the economy grew and other priorities emerged. Timetables for industrial policy
change have been influenced by foreign pressure at times, but there were usually
also domestic reasons for change as well. Many of the industrial supports
characteristic of the 1950s and 1960s have dwindled in importance as a result. As
Table 9 indicates, FILP lending to "basic" industry (including industrial technology)
has declined substantially and currently totals only about one-tenth of mid-1950s
shares of FILP lending. The offering of tax incentives for industrial sector
development has taken a similar downward trajectory. So have cartel agreements
between firms, although cartels continue as a preferred instrument of market
coordination during downturns in the economy. In addition, cartels have been
employed more in the medium and small enterprise sector recently than in markets
dominated by large firms, and their use has been common in recessed more than in
developing industries. At present, Japan's government continues to support research
projects designed to insure the country's development as a high technology, high
value-added 21st century economic power. With only a few exceptions, industrial
policy to encourage growth and new industry development is a thing of the past.
Conclusion
The Japanese economy grew dramatically between the 1950s and the
present. During the first two decades of this growth, the Japanese government
produced batteries of industrial policies with the goal of developing infrastructure and
achieving productivity gains in particular industries. In the 1970s and later,
government aid was provided the computer industry and "high" technology
development. Indicative economic plans which called for growth of the total economy
were also formulated. Because of the coincidence between government support and
economic success, Japan became known abroad as a successful example of
government-led high growth.
Evaluations of the direct role of indicative planning and so-called industrial
targeting have varied depending on scholarly biases and methodology choices.
Understanding government policy impact is difficult in the face of these divergences.
Assessing the separate contributions of government policy frameworks, commercial
bank decisions, general demand draw and other factors adds to the difficulties, as
does also the absence of satisfactory counter-factuals. However, it can be said with
confidence that:
(a) tax incentives, lending and some other instruments required by
key-industry development plans likely helped facilitate growth by creating favorable
conditions for investment in long-term capital improvements, iron and steel ad to a
lesser degree in other industries;
(b) the amounts of government investment in most industries were too small
relative to private bank funding to have the indicative effects often attributed to them;
(c) since commercial bank lending decisions depended on many different
factors, government lending likely played only a limited role after the early 1950s,
with the exception of the shipping, coal and electric power industries, where
government lending often matched private bank participation;
(d) government priorities also favored declining or problem industries in the
case of coal and shipping with the result that considerable amounts of government
funds were mis-allocated from an economic point of view (118);
(e) when the extensive supports given recessed industries, medium and
small industries and farmers are considered, Japan appears to be as much an
economic welfare and clientelist state as a developmental state.
Japanese economic and industrial performance also reflected the influence
of variables not clearly subject to the direct control of government. Japanese
companies have often competed intensely for market share which in turn favored
long-range planning and investment. A very high national savings ratio was itself of
vital importance as a support for capital investment and growth and usually was
sufficient to provide the funds needed for capital expansion. Even though the image
of the Japanese worker as a docile, highly motivated producer is overdrawn, labor's
role in growth was itself far from insignificant. The permanent employment system in
large corporations encouraged development of workplace discipline and strong
company loyalties. The presence of enterprise rather than industry unions in the
private sector was one of several factors encouraging stable labor conditions.
Improved process technologies such as the highly touted "just in time" auto
parts supply system have also made a big contribution to production efficiency and to
growth, Japan's educational system was itself undoubtedly a major factor
encouraging growth. On the supply side, it provided for high levels of literacy and
basic mathematics and science training, which ensured a high quality labor force,
other things being equal. On the demand side, mass education is one of many
factors in the development of modem communications systems and consumer-
market development.
All of this is not to say that the Japanese government played no role in the
economy's success. The government was usually a participant in high level
discussions of growth potentials and provided leadership for growth at a time when
private firms also saw that growth was both possible and profitable. The government
was, in effect, a cheerleader for growth, and shared vast amounts of information with
industry in the process. The government also provided a stable and supportive
environment for business growth. Businesses could invest without undue fear of
either nationalization of industries (as favored by the opposition in the 1950s) or other
major changes in the political environment. Government bank loans and policies also
created the perception in many firms that the government would stand behind
particular industries, which led firms in turn to make "daring" investments according
to some accounts.
The total effect of these conditions was to create a "policy regime" which
favored growth. Japanese government development of industrial zones adjacent to
deep water ports has also helped reduce the prices of some raw materials to as little
as one half of comparable prices in the United States, with its higher costs due to
dependence on land transportation (119). Indeed, the Japanese government's
investments in infra-structure have been enormous and may constitute its single
most important contribution to growth from the 1960s forward.
Government policies also played a direct but also hard-to-measure role in
specific industry development. The steel industry, for example, went through two
major renovation plans during the time that it was "targeted" for modernization, with
the result that Japan had the most advanced steelmaking equipment in the world by
the beginning of the 1960s. Government lending and leadership appear to have
facilitated this development. The Japanese automobile industry was protected from
foreign competition in its postwar period of infancy and was able to import foreign
technology at a critical juncture in its own development, even though it didn't receive
much in government loans. Government supported "rationalization" in the automobile
parts industry also may have had beneficial effects for the automobile industry. Later,
when development of automated machinery was a government priority in the 1960s
and 1970s, the automobile industry had higher levels of automation than industries in
other countries because of heavy investments in robots and other types of automated
equipment. These investments in improved facilities in some industries facilitated
rapid and dramatic increases in labor productivity, resulting in Japan's leading the
industrialized world in productivity increases in most recent years.
Frequent Japanese government policy adjustments in response to changing
market situations were also a plausible strength in some cases. Plans were reviewed
before their terminal dates and new plans were promulgated as growth outpaced
plan targets, or other planning parameters changed. An allededly frequent
adjustment of targets accords with a view which sees pragmatic, market following
behavior as a major advantage of Japanese government planning regimes (120).
Large amounts of market information were collected and used to define and
redefine targets and this extensive dependence on market indicators is also seen by
quite a few persons as one of the most positive contributions of the government's
policy-making (121). In essence, the policy environment itself became a component
in the overall environment to which individual firms and industries responded in their
own corporate strategies.
In some "macro" sense, the government provided a network of supportive
frameworks which may have facilitated industry success. However, there were also
many other factors influencing economic performance besides goverment actions,
and the government role should not be seen as the sole or even single strongest
influence on success in most instances. Indeed, as research shows, decisions at the
firm level reflect many concerns, and government policy is only one (at times large, at
times small) part of such environments. If Richard Samuels' findings on energy
industries are generalizable, the real issue for businesses in government-business
policy relationships is (a) how much the government can be persuaded to do what
the private sectors prefers and (b) how much government policy tools can be
exploited for private enterprise advantage. We have cited many examples of
unintended policy consequences reflecting private sector subvention, avoidance and
manipulation. Some policies also failed completely as the result of adverse economic
conditions or other factors including devious behavior by firms. The government role
in industry "guidance" has itself also declined in virtually all sectors from the early
1950s onward. This decline has often been ignored by the foreign press and elite
opinion abroad, with usually unfortunate policy implications.
While assessments of the government's role in terms beyond those
discussed already are difficult, there is no doubt as to the role of government as
focus, cheerleader and information provider. Intimate government-business
communications in advisory committees and govemment-business group meetings,
extensive negotiations of economic goals and the accumulation of large volumes of
statistics to support government planning activity must have had a substantial effect
in raising consciousness in the private sector about ongoing economic conditions and
opportunities. The extreme geographical centralization of Japanese big business in
Osaka and Tokyo, and the print media's concentration in these same cities,
undoubtedly further enhanced the flow of relevant information. The activity of
government indicative planning likely made important contributions to the thinking
and motivations of political and economic actors, even while the plans and targets
were not always directly reflected in GNP or targeted industry outcomes.
Postwar Japan was a country of high economic expectations, especially in
the late 1950s and 1960s. Expectations of high growth led firms to expand, which fed
growth itself. The policy regime of high growth expectations may have been the
government's major contribution.
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